In 2007 Finland changed ownership rights to inventions from its employees -"the professor's privilege" -to universities. We investigate how this change affected academic patenting using new data on inventors and patenting in Finland for the period 1995-2010. Matched sample panel data regressions using difference-in-differences show that patenting by individuals dropped by at least 29 percent after 2007. Unlike other countries studied, in Finland the reform was known before implementation. Adding the period after announcement to the reform period increases the drop in academic patenting to 46 percent. Our and others' results call into question whether the European reform of the professor's privilege were good innovation policy. 
Introduction
In 2007, Finland joined other European countries in a trend to switch ownership rights over inventions such that public universities now own the rights to inventions produced by researchers there. This revoked ownership rights previously held by aca-demic employees, commonly referred to as the "professor's privilege." Theory high-5 lights two main opposing forces when ownership rights change from the individual to the university. First, patenting may become easier for researchers because of more easily accessible university transfer assistance, which could speed up patenting. Second, through owning patenting rights, universities can tax patent incomes, reducing monetary incentives for researchers to invent.
10
We investigate the effects of the abolishment of the professor's privilege in Finland. Our investigation utilizes novel data on Finnish inventors collected for this paper, linked to individual employer-employee data in collaboration with Statistics Finland. We examine changes in inventive outcomes for academic researchers, contrasting these changes with those in control groups from institutes and firms, respectively, in 15 difference-in-differences regressions. We rely mainly on matched samples based on coarsened exact matching (CEM) at the individual level.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Very few papers in this area of research utilize economy-wide data on inventors. Access to good data allows us to control for demographic composition, education and individual (innate) 20 propensities to patent through fixed effects. Importantly, it also allows the exploitation of the experimental nature of the policy reform through the creation of an appropriate control group against which to compare the effects on academic inventors. This allows the identification of a plausibly causal effect of the policy reform. Although several well-established microeconometric techniques allow the identification of causal rela-25 tionships, such as instrumental variables, regression discontinuity and differences-indifferences (DiD; see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009) , our paper is only one of three that attempts to causally identify an effect, all applying a DiD approach (Czarnitzki et al., 2015; Hvide and Jones, 2016) . The DiD setup enables us to study changes in patenting in academia, which is contrasted with developments at institutes and in the 30 private sector. This gives us the ability to "net out" contributions to the groups studied that, although time varying, are common over time. For instance, technological progress or business cycles can lead to swings in patenting that are common to all three groups. Not controlling for such trends would confound policy reform effects with other trend effects that distort interpretation. This paper therefore helps us understand 35 whether the consequences of changing the IP-patenting regime has effects consistent with the other studies, but in a quite different setting. It is highly policy relevant if we can establish that the results of this major and much debated European reform led to similar outcomes across different countries, each with its own unique combination of institutional features.
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We find that the case of Finland differs in many ways from other cases studied. In Finland, the IP-regime change took place in the midst of a major restructuring of the telecom sector. It also took place just before the start of the recession in 2007, which means that the post-reform period could be affected by slower economic development.
Another important difference is that our study reveals pre-reform effects in Finland that 45 seem to have influenced academic patenting behavior even before implementation, but after announcement of the reform.
The analysis shows the importance of taking structural factors into account. Our most reliable analyzes use the private sector as the main control group. We also omit the firm with the most patenting to remove trend effects in the control group. The 50 results indicate an adverse effect on university patenting. Contrary to the expectation that the reform would stimulate patenting, we observe a 29 percent drop in university researcher patenting in our matched sample analysis. In addition, by including the period before the reform but after the announcement of it, our preferred specification, the drop increases to 46 percent.
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We thus show how the DiD framework can be adapted to deal with circumstances that deviate from the standard DiD setup in an evaluation of academic IP-regime change.
In robustness analyses, we delve into the sensitivity of our results by examining two potentially mitigating or reinforcing factors of the Finnish IP-reform. Government funds were raised substantially in order to stimulate commercialization of research 60 and technology transfer after the reform. Although imprecisely measured, as TULI funds can be observed only as part of other government funds from Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation and Technology, our analysis of universities that had large increases in Tekes funds after 2007 experienced no statistically different effect on patenting from other universities in terms of patenting. We also analyze whether but find that this is most likely not the reason. Our and others' results call into question whether the European reform of the professor's privilege were good innovation policy. Our findings also add to existing evidence that any potentially positive effects from increased tech transfer support does not outweigh the downside of eliminating the 70 professor's privilege.
Literature review
In much of Europe, until the early 2000s default ownership of inventions by university researchers rested with the individual. The inspiration for the change in Europe in ownership to that of universities came from the United States, which in 1980 through 75 the Bayh-Dole Act set the default rights of invention ownership from federally funded research at the university level (Mowery et al., 2001) . It should be noted that the European and American starting points were different, however. The US reform involved a decentralization of ownership, whereas later European reforms implied centralization (Von Proff et al., 2012) . A sharp rise in university patenting was observed at American 80 universities in the 1980s and 1990s (Trajtenberg et al., 1997) . But it has never been established whether this was due to (a) the reform, (b) other reforms that strengthened patent rights around the same time, (c) increased patentability in, for example, biotech, or (d) a rising rate of academic patenting that had begun already in the 1970s (Mowery et al., 2001 ). On balance, it seems likely that this decentralization may have helped cre-85 ate better incentives for individual researchers, because the Bayh-Dole Act implied that technology transfer offices were established at many American universities (Audretsch and Göktepe-Hultén, 2015; Coupé, 2003) . However, the case for switching from the individual level to university ownership in Europe was less clear-cut. Theoretically, the effects of changing from the individual level to university ownership centers on 90 arguments that university administrations offer efficiency gains. This stems from the assumption that researchers are less capable of finding suitable industry partners than are their technology transfer officers (Verspagen, 2006) . The downside to university ownership, however, is higher (transaction) costs, which "tax" university inventors. A common distribution seems to be one in which, net of university costs, one-third of the 95 profits go to the inventor and two-thirds to the university, as in Germany and Norway (Hvide and Jones, 2016 , cited below as HJ). Lowe (2006) highlights some of the trade-offs in a theoretical model. He analyzes the technology transfer process in situations in which the development of an invention requires active tacit knowledge transfer from the inventor. This assumption is realis-100 tic, as many observers have concluded that inventions are rarely ready for commercialization "off the shelf" but, rather, need the active assistance of the originator (the researcher) to be developed (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Zucker et al., 1998 ). In the model by Lowe (2006) , in cases in which a sufficiently high level of tacit knowledge is required, inventors prefer to start their own firm, through which they develop their 105 invention to the point that it is ready for commercialization. This is because tacit effort requires compensation to the inventor in the form of royalties that lower profit and reduce output (given that demand for inventor knowledge is elastic). As in the discussion in the literature, Lowe (2006) stresses three roles through which universities can help inventors. First, they spread fixed costs associated with administration, licensing,
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and other intellectual property costs across many commercializable inventions. Second, they function as intermediaries bringing licensees together with inventors. That is, they find actors ready to commercialize results that inventors might otherwise not find. Finally, universities may be better negotiators than individual inventors. The trade-offs in costs and gains are thus between those who do not need the assistance of 115 universities, which mainly face losses in the form of "university taxation," vs. otherwise noncommercialized inventions for which inventors may now find an actor willing to commercialize them. It can easily be perceived that the first cost could discourage researchers from inventing (Lowe, 2006; Thursby et al., 2009) The net contribution by universities is therefore not obvious and may vary from 120 invention to invention. It is determined in part by the skills of the technology transfer office. Theoretically, individuals without patenting experience could gain from advice that universities can offer. However, the willingness to contribute to an invention could decline for inventors with established firm networks (Czarnitzki et al., 2015 , cited below as CZ). These theoretical intricacies did not stop European countries from adopting 125 university ownership rights, disregarding the need for a sound empirical basis. In the recent wave, Denmark went first in 2001, closely followed by Germany and Austria (2002 ), Norway (2005 ), and Finland (2007 .
1 Lissoni et al. (2009) investigate the case of Denmark, but the lack of data on individuals before the reform limits the ability to understand its effects, although it is clear that university ownership of academic patents 130 increased at the expense of patents invented by academic researchers but applied for directly by commercial firms, as expected. In Italy, national legislation decreed a switch from university ownership to individual ownership. However, this reform was largely circumvented by local university regulations that effectively reversed the legislation and reinforced university ownership (Lissoni, 2013; Lissoni et al., 2009 field, or gender (Huang et al., 2011; Levin and Stephan, 1991) . A similar approach, using firm inventors as a control group, by HJ also indicates a strong negative effect in Norway. Their study reveals not only a substantial decline in patenting but also a strong decline in firm start-ups by academics.
A few studies do not explicitly evaluate the shifting reform but provide other evi-
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dence. In this respect, Sweden is an interesting country as it is one of the few countries in Europe to retain its professor's privilege. Ejermo and Källström (2016) examine the level of academic patenting in Sweden that results as a consequence of academic R&D (whose exogenous variation is plausibly explained by field-external R&D at the university), which is examined and contrasted with the case of the United States, the 170 only other country for which such evidence exists (Coupé, 2003; Gurmu et al., 2010) .
The paper reports that university patenting in Sweden responds at least as well, if not better, to academic R&D resources than the United States. Another Swedish-US comparison is made by Åstebro et al. (2016) . They examine the entry of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) PhDs into entrepreneurship and differen-tials between university wages and earnings from becoming an entrepreneur in the two countries, contrasting this with the baseline entrance rate by non-academics. They find that Swedish academics are more likely to enter into entrepreneurship than the country baseline, and while average earnings drop in both countries, they drop less in Sweden. the right -but not the obligation -to claim patent rights to all inventions made by university researchers when the inventions were conceived during work that was financed in whole or in part with external public research funding. Because of the dominant role of this type of funding in university budgets, the reform had wide-ranging implications for all university researchers, although they could still claim ownership of inventions
205
conceived during "open research", i.e., research conducted without external funding.
The new legislation closed a decade-long effort to shift intellectual property rights to research-based innovations from researchers to universities (Kutinlahti, 2005, p. 71) .
The key argument of reformers was that university inventions were not utilized because inventors did not have sufficient resources or that the ownership of inventions were too 210 easily subject to dispute (Government of Finland, 2004, p. 9) . Moreover, universities of applied sciences already owned intellectual property rights to employees' inventions.
However, no report advocating the reform cited evidence or research assessing the extent of the supposed problem with utilization of research. In Finland, the reception to the new legislation has been mixed, and no comprehensive evaluation of it has been 215 carried out so far. The legislative reform was introduced in tandem with an increase in public funding to support research commercialization activities at the universities. taled EUR 26 million (Tahvanainen, 2009) . In sum, the direct and indirect support for commercialization of research and patenting of academic research was at a significant level well before the new legislation in 2007, but increased dramatically thereafter.
Empirical analysis
For our empirical analysis, we use as our base the DiD regression technique. DiD 250 starts with the premise that there is a treated group, in our case the university sector, and control group(s), in our case, institutes and the private sector. Treated and control groups are observed both before and after "treatment," that is, the abolition of the professor's privilege. By comparing changes in the treated group before and after the policy change with the developments of the control group(s), any trend effect that is com-255 mon to all groups is eliminated. Our main outcome variable is a dummy for whether an individual is listed as an inventor in a specific year. The key identifying assumption in a DiD analysis is the presence of common trends, according to which, without treatment, the main underlying trend would be the same in treated and control groups. In practice, we implement this analysis by observing at which of the three groups (uni-260 versity/institute/private) individuals work, which is captured by dummy variables, and a dummy is added for those who work in academia post-treatment. That last variable is our main variable of interest.
There are several threats to identification. training programs see a drop in real income prior to their program participation. In our case, a drop in patenting before the reform among university researchers would constitute a violation to the common trends assumption, which cannot be accounted for by the inclusion of additional control variables. Applying for a patent can be seen as an investment for the inventor in which the return consists of future license income.
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News of the reform creates uncertainty about the returns for prospective applicants and academic inventors, because if they file a patent application, the returns may end up with the researcher's employer after granting (in the future). Given that the duration from application to the granting of a patent is typically around four years (Cohen and Merrill, 2003, 
Data
The most important piece of information for this project was data on Finnish inventors that we compiled and organized by linking inventor data with employee registers.
This step is crucial and more difficult for countries in which universities generally do not own patents. In fact, a distinct result of research in this area has been in showing 320 that differences between European and US academic patenting can be explained largely by these ownership patterns, in which patents on university inventions patents include those with inventors working in academia but for which the patent owner is generally a firm (or sometimes individuals) outside academia (Lissoni et al., 2008; Meyer, 2006) .
Thus, to identify Finnish academic patents, we cannot rely on applicant information.
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An important difference in our identification of inventors is that we extensively rely on their home address, a highly unique identifier, in combination with Statistics Finland registers on the home address of the entire population, rather than the firm's address. As an example of "hidden" academic patents, prior to the new legislation in 2007, Finnish universities applied for or held few patents (cf. Meyer, 2006) . It has been estimated 330 that, just before the new legislation, Finnish universities held 20 patents and had about 37 pending applications -of which 37 were from the Helsinki University of Technology (Hjelt et al., 2006, p. 32) .
For our purposes, we first extracted each patent record from OECD PATSTAT data moved that year. The strictest matching methods, which demand matches on many parameters, were used first and then successively fewer parameters were used. Exact matching was used, which does not allow for spelling variations. One of the constraints 350 set in matching was that only adults were allowed to be linked from the population records. The final result was a nearly 91 percent match rate on Finnish inventors. To these data were added information on whether the individual was working at a university, an institute or a firm, and demographic characteristics from register data. Finding out whether the individual was a university, institute, or a firm employee was not trivial
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and involved a judgement on the choice of indicator to use. To determine this, a priority order was created in which information on firm affiliation, firm owner, legal form, and NACE code was used. Online Appendix B gives more detail on this allocation. individuals to one of the three groups. We observe more than 13,000 individuals who were ever inventors in 1995-2010, or 0.3 percent of individuals for whom we could delineate an affiliation. Large differences in inventor shares exist among the three groups.
Descriptive information
The highest share of inventors is found at institutes, about 1.6 percent, or more than 500 individuals. At universities, the corresponding share is 1.1 percent, or about 1,200 385 inventors. Among firms, the share is the lowest, only 0.2 percent, but this corresponds to nearly 11,700 inventors. Therefore, the incentives and motivations to be an inventor and strategies toward patenting vary substantially by group, such as subsector and field of research. rates rose throughout. Later, we run our regressions, removing the biggest firm from the analysis to gauge how this affects our results. 
Regression analyses

Difference-in-differences regressions on the full sample
Our first set of estimated regressions takes the form:
where P at it is a count variable that shows on how many applied patents in year t an individual i is listed as an inventor. P ost t takes a value of 1 beginning in 2007, and U ni i is the treated group of individuals, that is, university researchers, Inst i is a dummy for institute employees, with firm employees in the omitted category. We chose patent counts as our main outcome variable, as it also takes the heterogeneity of patenting into account. Our individual panel regressions modify this slightly as
where, 0 P ost t is fully accounted for through year-fixed effects, t . We also include a full set of individual fixed effects i to account for time-invariant heterogeneity 410 among individuals that absorb . Individual-fixed effects are redundant only when individuals do not change to another group (and hence U ni i ; Inst i are time invariant).
Therefore both sets of variables are initially included, and we later examine the effects of the reform on mobility out of academia.
One threat to identification in DiD frameworks concerns violations of common trends. This can happen if, for instance, the rate of patenting increases more rapidly among university employees before the reform than in other groups. Post-reform patenting in relation to other groups would then appear to be an increase, in which this would result only as part of a persistent trend. Of greatest concern for our case is the pre-announcement of the reform and strong institute trends. A simple way to test for pre-reform trends is to multiply group effects by a trend variable and add them as separate variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Besley and Burgess, 2004) :
where t is a time trend variable. A change in our coefficient of interest 2 because 415 of the inclusion of the trend variable suggests that post-reform changes are mainly due to trend effects. Table 2 reports the regressions based on equations (2) it insignificant in the second regression (model 2). It is clear that we have to look much further into our data.
< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >
Matched sample regressions
Our first set of regressions revealed that trend effects were important, but it is not 425 clear exactly why. We now turn to matched sample analyses, which reduces problems in interpretation that depend on the composition of treated and non-treated groups.
For instance, different individuals may react differently to the reform, and it could be that the group composition in populations systematically leads to differences that have nothing to do with the reform. It could also be that changing to a matched sample
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reduces the trend problems observed above. A first step is to examine the education characteristics of inventors at universities, firms, and institutes, as we know that inventive activity is highly dependent on the level of education (Giuri et al., 2007; Jung and Ejermo, 2014; Toivanen and Väänänen, 2015) . Tables 3-4 show education data for individuals who were ever inventors, at the time of their first invention.
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< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > < TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > Table 3 shows that the education background of most inventors is in technology fields, followed by the natural sciences and then health-related fields. About 4 percent of inventors came from other education backgrounds. In relative terms, technology 440 education is more common among firm inventors, health-related education is more common among university inventors, and agriculture and forestry education is more common among institute researchers, where this is more common than health-related backgrounds. guaranteeing common support over the entire distribution, whereas, in more standard propensity score matching, this has to be checked after matching. We use one-to-one matching for the purpose of finding for each university employee a similar individual in the other groups. Our strategy of focusing on highly educated university employees who are more likely to invent is in line with other recent contributions. CZ 460 used propensity scores to match German professors to "nearest neighbors," choosing as match parameters publication counts, publication subject field, and career age. HJ used propensity scores to find the single-nearest neighbor to each university-employed PhD. They matched on PhD type, gender, and marital status.
Lacking data on publications, we use the following matching criteria: exact match the earlier recognition that the institutes are so strongly dominated by one actor, we continue the analyses using only the (b) and (c) matched samples. Table 7 reports on matched sample estimations using Poisson regressions and the setup in equation (2). We include the firm with the most patenting in models 1-3 and exclude it in models 4-6. We follow equation (3) by including trend effects in models 2 and 5. We see that, compared to firm employees, the rate of patenting by university employees drops by 22 percent (model 1) when we include the firm with the most patenting, and by 29 percent (model 4) when we exclude it. The inclusion of trend variables changes the result quite dramatically when we include the firm with the most patenting (model 2), in which the coefficient turns positive but is not significant. Instead, when we exclude the firm with the most patenting, the effects remain almost identically negative at -29 percent (model 5). It remains significant at the 5 percent level. These conflicting results suggest that researchers may either have changed behavior prior to the reform or that the firm sample without the firm with the most patenting is the more relevant one. In order to get a better understanding of the existence of pre-reform behavior and post-reform dynamics, we include lead and lag effects for the treated university researchers (cf. Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Granger, 1969) . This is done by augmenting equation (2) with university-specific year effects and removing the U ni i P ost t term (as it is captured by the lag effects) as in: 
Shifting the reform start period
500
We have now seen that there might be a pre-reform decline not explained by de- percent, depending on whether we include the announcement period in the comparison.
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< 
Robustness analyses
We have found evidence that, although the setting for Finland differed in many respects from the main comparison cases, the main results were similar. But we have 525 also seen that the announcement of the reform seemed to affect university researcher patenting prior to the reform. We now conduct additional analyses of 4 (1) those who leave academia ("leavers"), and (2) the role of technology transfer (TULI) funds that accompanied the reform.
Leavers from academia
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Budding inventors may have chosen to remain in or leave academia because they anticipated changing conditions for invention in academia-for instance, as a result of increased "taxation" on academic patenting. Alternatively, inventors may have chosen to leave academia after the reform was implemented, after the practical consequences became clear. Ideally, one would somehow redo the regressions to examine whether 535 patenting behavior changed in any way. But it is not trivial to use a DiD framework to define to which group a "leaver" belongs. Instead, it is more straightforward to re-run the regressions on those who remain ("remainers"). However, if we define a remainer as someone who worked in the same group throughout the 2003-2010 period, using the main firm-matched sample, we lose more than 80 percent of observations, creating 540 great difficulty in generalizing the results. We therefore pursue a different and arguably more direct analysis by making mobility (whether one leaves) the outcome variable itself and therefore examine whether mobility changes as a result of the reform. The hypothesis here is that university employees, in general, are not necessarily affected by the reform, but that individuals with invention experience might leave the university 545 sector. Our first regression, shown in Table 9 , model 1, shows year-by-year effects for all university employees (in all regressions, we retain only observations of those who leave the university sector for the first time). The baseline, captured in the constant term, is the period before 2004. Clearly, mobility shows an increasing trend over the years [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . This is unlikely to be the result of the patenting reform but could be the result of, for example, funding systems. However, cohort effects should be captured in the individual-fixed effects included. Model 2 looks only at university employees who have invented. We also see a slightly increasing trend in mobility for this group, but it is not as strong as for the general group of university employees. Therefore, any increased mobility among inventors may be the result of a general increase in 555 mobility by university employees. We directly test whether inventors are different from the general population of university employees in model 3, in which we add year dummies interacted with a dummy for whether the individual has invented. Significant interaction effects would indicate that inventors have a different propensity to leave than the general group of employees. We find only three significant effects. For 2004,
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we find a weakly positive and significant effect for inventors, but for 2009 and 2010 it is negative and quite significant. The effect for 2010 is substantial, but it seems hard to link these year effects to the reform in 2007. The general conclusion is therefore that mobility among inventors was not the primary cause for the drop in university patenting.
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< TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE >
Does technology transfer funding matter?
We have We then coded a variable "HiT ekes" as 1 for researchers active at those universi-595 ties and re-ran the firm matched sample regression with and without the biggest firm (cf. never had a professor's privilege) from the estimations, although this effect is likely to be small. These results put Finland in between but also in line with the evidence in Norway (-48 percent) and Germany (-19 percent), as found by Czarnitzki et al. (2015) and Hvide and Jones (2016) .
We also analyzed, first, whether mobility among researchers could explain the
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Finnish decline and, second, whether technology transfer funds helped mitigate the negative effects. We find no evidence that mobility among inventors increased substantially, at least not relative to the general group of university employees, although we see an increasing trend of outward mobility among university inventors (and noninventors) over time. We also find no strong evidence that technology transfer funds 635 changed patenting outcomes relative to recipients who did not receive increased funds, although these results build on somewhat imprecise data.
Given the reform's negative impact on university patenting, we can consider its feasibility and broader potential implications for incentives for university researchers to invent. Should the reform be reversed? Almost a decade has passed since its in-640 troduction, and the potential effects of a reversal should receive careful consideration.
Moreover, by now, the universities have had sufficient time to implement new research commercialization practices. Most importantly, our study does not cast any light on recent developments, something that would be necessary to consider in any major policy reform. Table 7 : Poisson difference-in-difference regressions using a firm matched sample. Dependent variable individual-level applied patent counts.
(1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (1) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 9 : Mobility of university employees.
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